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THE FLORIDA LABORER'S LIEN

1974)

THE FLORIDA LABORER'S LIEN: AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CREDITOR'S REMEDY?
Since the Supreme Court's landmark decisions in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., and Fuentes v. Shevin,2 and the consequent application of
due process requirements of prior notice and hearing to summary prejudgment remedies, scarcely a procedure in the creditors' arsenal has gone
unchallenged. Numbered among the casualties are prejudgment attachment,3
7
6
garnishment4 replevin,5 the innkeeper's lien, and the landlord's lien. Particularly significant are the due process challenges directed toward the repairman's or mechanic's lien.8 Because of the similarity between the challenged
statutes and Florida's Laborer's Lien Law,9 the success of these challenges
raises serious questions concerning the latter's constitutionality. Recently, however, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.10 has undercut to an
as yet undetermined extent the prior notice and hearing requirements of
Sniadach and Fuentes, adding a new dimension to the constitutional questions surrounding Florida's laborer's lien. This commentary will examine the
dictates of Sniadach, Fuentes, and their progeny, the extent to which these
dictates remain valid in a post-Mitchell context, and the newly enunciated
principles of Mitchell to determine whether the laborer's lien works a deprivation of property without due process.
Sniadach, Fuentes, AND Mitchell: BACKGROUND
Until 1969 the taking of property within the context of prejudgment
remedies largely escaped due process scrutiny.:" Creditors' unfettered enjoyment of summary procedures allowing seizure of a debtor's property before

I. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2.

407 U.S. 67 (1972).

3. See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971).
4. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Western Coach Corp.
v. Shreve, 475 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1973); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720 (D.
Conn. 1973); McMeans v. Schwartz, 330 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
5. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
6. See, e.g., Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Blye v.
Globe-Wemicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972); MacQueen v. Lambert,
348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
8. See, e.g., Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga.), modified, 364 F. Supp. 452
(N.D. Ga. 1973); Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
9. FLA. STAT. §§85.011, .031, 713.59 (1973).
10. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
11. The due process infirmity of prejudgment remedies was so unsuspected that as late
as 1967 a leading expert on creditors' rights was able to state: "Although attachment is a
harsh remedy because it deprives the debtor of his power of disposition over assets prior to
the judicial ascertainment of his liability, the constitutionality of this procedure is firmly
establishfed." S. RIESENFELD, CREDrroR's REMEDIES AND DEBToR's PROTECTION 180 (1967),
cited in Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed, 79 CASE & COMMENT 3 (1974).
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trial and without notice or hearing resulted from the belief that such seizures,
because of their conditional and temporary nature, were not the type of
12
deprivation prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
Dispelling this notion, the Supreme Court in Sniadach found the interim
freezing of wages a sufficiently significant taking of property to warrant the
invocation of due process safeguards.13 Wisconsin garnishment statutes 4 permitted the clerk of the court to issue a writ of garnishment once a creditor
filed suit against a defaulting debtor. The debtor's wages were then frozen
by service of the writ upon the garnishee. Emphasizing the fact that wages
are a specialized form of property the deprivation of which may cause extreme hardship, 15 the Court held that the Wisconsin procedure violated fundamental principles of due process by permitting a taking of property without
prior notice and hearing.' 6 The Court added, however, that a summary taking
of property might comport with due process in "extraordinary situations.""
Several difficult and unanswered questions remained after Sniadach.18 Per-

haps the most significant involved the uncertain scope of the Court's holding
that a temporary taking of property required prior notice and hearing. Relying on the emphasis placed upon wages as a specialized form of property and

the hardships accompanying their loss, some courts refused to extend the
prior notice and hearing requirements of Sniadach beyond wage garnishment1 9 and other prejudgment remedies affecting "necessities of life." 2 0 Other

12. See McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 116, 141 A. 699, 702 (1928), aff'd per curialn,
279 U.S. 820 (1929). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, provides in part: "IN]or shall any State
deprive any person of... property, without due process of law .... " (Emphasis added.) The
Supreme Court had also indicated that where property rights were concerned, due process
required only that there be a hearing at some time. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931).
13. As one commentator has suggested, the primary import of Sniadach lay in bringing
the temporary deprivation of property within the purview of the fourteenth amendment.
Comment, Creditors'Prehearing Remedies and Due Process, 14 ARMz. L. REV. 834, 836 (1972).
14. AVsS. STAT. §§267.01-.24 (1965).
15. 395 U.S. at 340-42.
16. Id. at 342.
17. Id. at 339. As examples of "extraordinary situations" where summary procedures
might be justified because of the need for special protection of a state or creditor interest,
the Court cited Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (summary seizure
of misbranded foodstuff dangerous to the public health); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947) (summary transfer of bank holdings to prevent loss of financial integrity); Coffin Bros.
& Co. v. Bennet, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (summary execution of liens to prevent bank collapse);
Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) (foreign attachment to secure jurisdiction over nonresident debtor).
18. For a discussion of the questions posed by Sniadach, see Clark & Landers, Sniadach,
Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 357-59 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970); Reeves
v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011, 1016 (N.D. Ga. 1971). One commentator also concluded that Sniadach was limited to wage garnishment. Comment, Constitutional Law:
Garnishment lVithout Notice and Hearing Is Denial of Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV.
853, 860 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722-23 (N.D.N.Y.
1970). This construction of Sniadach was reinforced by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
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jurisdictions, however, read Sniadach as enunciating a basic principle of due

process applicable to any taking of property, and hence, to summary prejudgment remedies other than garnishment.21 A second question was raised by
the Court's cursory suggestion that summary procedures would satisfy due
process in extraordinary situations. Little indication was given as to what
might constitute such a situation.22 Finally, the Court failed to specify the

type of hearing required.23
In Fuentes the Supreme Court considered due process challenges to Florida2 4 and Pennsylvania 2 5 replevin statutes. Under Florida procedure, a creditor,

upon instituting an action for repossession, was able to obtain a writ of replevin by making an ex-parte application to the clerk of the court and posting

a bond for double the value of the property to be seized. After executing the
writ the sheriff was reqtired to keep- the property for three days, during
which time the debtor might regaifi possession by posting his own bond for
double the value of the property. If the debtor failed to post bond, possession

of the property was transferred to the creditor pending final judgment. The
Pennsylvania procedure was similar, differing only in that the creditor was

not required to institute an action for repossession prior to seeking a writ
of replevin. The Court found that both statutes worked a deprivation of
property without due process of law insofar as they failed to provide the

debtor an opportunity to be heard before his property was seized.2 8
More important, however, was the Court's treatment of issues left unresolved by Sniadach. First, the Court flatly rejected the idea that the principles

of Sniadach were limited to situations involving necessities of life,2 7 indicating
that a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of any significant property interest
would require prior notice and a prior hearing.28 Second, because due process

In holding that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was necessary before a welfare
recipient's funds could be cut off, the Court emphasized the grievous consequences of such
a termination. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). The Court also noted that a
driver's license is often relied upon for the pursuit of a livelihood in holding that Georgia
was required to provide a hearing on the issue of liability before suspending a driver's
license for failing to carry insurance at the time of an accident. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 539 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 618 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Adams v. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973) (self-help repossession by a secured creditor); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 122 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (innkeeper's lien).
22: It is unclear whether the Court intended that only a public or governmental
interest might override the requirement of prior notice and hearing, or whether a creditor's
interest would suffice. Moreover, the Court gave no indication of how to determine when
an interest was of sufficient import to render a given situation "extraordinary." See Clark
& Landers, supra note 18, at 358.
23. Id.'
24. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 254, §28, at 660.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§1821-47 (1967).
26. 407 U.S. at 96.
27. Id. at 88-90.
28. Appellants had purchased the replevied goods under a conditional sales contract
and therefore lacked full legal title. The Court made it clear, however, that fourteenth
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is not aimed at promoting efficiency or accommodating all interests, the Court
found that the normal expense of providing an adequate hearing could not
outweigh the constitutional right.2 9 Summary prejudgment seizure of property
is constitutionally permissible only in extraordinary situations where the
seizure is necessary to secure an important governmental or public interest,
where there is a particular need for prompt action, and where the state
strictly controls its use of legitimate force.3 0 Finally, the Court clarified the
nature of the hearing required by the fourteenth amendment, explaining
that it must afford an opportunity for a determination of at least the probable
validity of the creditor's underlying claim. 31 Moreover, substitute safeguards
of the debtor's interests such as a bond requirement could not take the place
8 2
of such a hearing.
Withdrawing significantly from the broad dictates of Fuentes, the Su33
preme Court in Mitchell found that Louisiana's sequestration statutes
afforded a debtor due process despite the absence of any provision for notice
or a hearing prior to the seizure of his property. 34 Under Louisiana's sequestration procedure, a creditor claiming ownership or the right to possess property,
or a lien thereon, is entitled to have the property sequestered if it is within
the power of the debtor to conceal, dispose of, waste, or remove the property
during pendency of the actionY3 To obtain a writ of sequestration the creditor
must petition the court, stating specific facts that clearly indicate the nature
of the claim, the amount thereof, and the grounds relied upon for issuance

amenment protection of property was not limited to the interest of ownership, but extended to the interest in continued use and possession. Id. at 86-87.
29. Id. at 90 n.22.
30. The Court drew these three requirements from prior cases permitting summary
seizure of property by the government. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S.
594 (1950) (protecting public from misbranded foodstuff); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245 (1947) (protecting against economic disaster of bank failure); Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589 (1931) (collecting internal revenue); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254
U.S. 554 (1921) (furthering war effort); North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago,
211 U.S. 306 (1908) (protecting public against contaminated food). It is unclear whether
each of these requirements must be present, or whether one or more is sufficient. Further,
while the Fuentes Court's application of the three requirements indicates that they are
apposite to the invocation of governmental power to seize a person's property for private
purposes, their applicability to instances of seizure by the creditor himself is uncertain.
See Comment, Constitutional Law-Creditor-Debtor Law: ProceduralDue Process and Washington's Prejudgment Seizure Procedures - Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), 48 WASH.
L. REv. 646, 655-60 (1973).
31. 407 U.S. at 97.
32. Id. at 83-84.
33. LA. CODE OF CIv. PRO. ANN. arts. 3501, 06, 07, 08, 71, 74 (West 1961).
34. 94 S. Ct. at 1898.
35. The Supreme Court in Fuentes intimated that summary action might be justified
to protect the creditor's interest if the debtor intended to destroy or conceal the disputed
goods. 407 U.S. at 93. Louisiana sequestration statutes, however, permit summary action
if it is within the power of the debtor to conceal or destroy the disputed property. LA. CODE
Cmx. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961). It is doubtful, therefore, that the scope of Louisiana
sequestration procedure is sufficiently narrow to qualify as an "exceptional situation" under
Sniadach and Fuentes.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss4/8

4

Tilghman: The Florida Laborer's Lien: An Unconstitutional Creditor's Remedy
1974]

THE FLORIDA LABORER'S LIEN

of the writ. In addition, the creditor is required to post sufficient bond to protect the debtor in the event the writ is wrongly issued. The debtor is entitled
to seek immediate dissolution of the writ by filing a contradictory motion with
the court. Dissolution must be granted unless the creditor proves the grounds
upon which the writ was issued. The debtor may also regain possession of his
property by posting his own bond to protect the creditor.
The Mitchell decision rests squarely upon the proposition that any resolution of the due process issue with respect to summary prejudgment remedies
must take into account the interests of both the debtor and the creditor.36 In
the Court's view, Louisiana's sequestration procedure effects a "constitutional
accommodation" of these conflicting interests. Allowing seizure of the disputed property without prior notice or hearing protects the creditor against
erosion of his security interest until such time as a hearing is possible, and
against the bad faith debtor who, with advance warning, might conceal, destroy, or alienate the property. 38 Conversely, the risk that the debtor will be
unjustifiably deprived of possession of his property is minimized by the fact
that the proof required for issuance of the writ is particularly suited to demonstration in an ex parte proceeding, 9 and by the fact that damages may be
awarded if the writ is wrongfully obtained. 40 In addition, the impact of an
improvidently issued writ is circumscribed by granting the debtor an immediate hearing on the issue of possession with the burden of proof falling
upon the creditor.41 Pointedly, the Court noted that the debtor's interest is
protected in every conceivable manner, save allowing him initial possession
of the property, and that the property is placed in the hands of the party
providing the other with the most protection against loss or damage. 42 To
justify its conclusion that due process may be sated without prior notice and
a hearing, the Court recalled that due process guarantees "no particular form
43
of procedure; it protects substantial rights."
DUE PROCESS AND THE MEcHANIc's LIEN

The mechanic's or repairman's lien, providing for retention and public
sale of chattel to which unpaid claims for repairs have attached, has been attacked successfully on the basis of Sniadach and Fuentes in Georgia, 44 West
46
Virginia, 45 and California.

36. 94 S. Ct. at 1898.
37. Id. at 1901.
38. Id. at 1900-01.
39. Id. at 1901.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1905.
43. Id. at 1901, citing NLRB v. Mackay Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938).
44. Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
45." - Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
46. Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., App.'Dep't
1973) (vacated and rehearing ordered on court's motion).
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In Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co.4 7 the repair bill for a vehicle far exceeded
its value and the owner refused payment. West Virginia's improver's lien law48
entitled persons repairing vehicles to retain possession thereof if payment was
refused, and upon written notice to the owner to sell the vehicle at public
auction. Pursuant to the lien law the repairman retained possession of the
vehicle and threatened public sale. The owner brought suit in federal district
court challenging the validity of West Virginia's improver's lien law on due
process grounds. The court struck down the statutory provisions for enforcement of the lien, holding that their failure to provide an opportunity for
the owner of a vehicle to be heard before being deprived of his property
49
constituted a denial of due process of law.

Georgia's mechanic's lien law also permitted a mechanic to retain a vehicle
until payment was made, and further provided for enforcement of the lien
by sale at a public auction.50 To effect such a sale, however, the mechanic
was required to swear out and file an affidavit attesting to the validity of his
claim in an appropriate court. Thereafter, the court issued an execution instanter and the lien was foreclosed by levy and sale. Relying on Sniadach and
Fuentes a Georgia federal district court in Mason v. Garris5' held that the
statutory provisions authorizing foreclosure of the mechanic's lien by levy
and sale were unconstitutional insofar as they deprived a person of the use
of his property without affording a hearing as to the validity of the mechanic's
2

claim.5

Both Straley and Mason were grounded upon the premise that due process
requires notice and a hearing before a debtor can be deprived of the use and
possession of his property. Whether the statutory procedures in question
would be found to comply with due process under the more flexible approach
of Mitchell is therefore open to question. Straley and Mason remain, however, as important indicants that the requirements of due process delineated
in Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell are applicable to the deprivation of pro53
perty associated with a mechanic's or repairman's lien.

47. 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
48. W. VA. CODE ANN. § §38-11-3, -14 (1961). West Virginia has no specific lien provisions
for work done upon motor vehicles. A repairman may assert such a lien under the general
provisions of the improver's lien law, which recognizes a lien in favor of one who in any
way enhances the value of another's personal property. Id.
49. 359 F. Supp. at 905. The court in Straley reasoned largely by analogy to decisions
finding West Virginia's landlord summary distress procedure unconstitutional. Shaffer v.
Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. W. Va. 1972); State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 190 S.E.2d
770 (W. Va. 1972).
50. GA. CODE ANN. §§67-2401, 68-423a (1967).
51. 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
52. Id. at 423; accord, Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Los Angeles
Super. Ct., App. Dep't 1973). The Quebec decision was vacated and a rehearing ordered
pending the outcome of consideration by the California supreme court of the constitutionality
of the garageman's lien.
53. One of the major questions involved in a consideration of the constitutionality of
the Florida laborer's lien is whether the due process strictures of Sniadach, Fuentes, and
Mitchell. formulated as they were in a context where the government participated directly
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A contrary view was expressed in-Hernandez v. European Auto Collision,
Inc.54 where "a federal district court held that enforcement of a garageman's
lien either by retention or public 'sale of the property did not violate the
principles of -due process. Disissing the complaint, the court reasoned that
the debtor's voluntary surrender of the vehicle gave the lienor a property
interest therein commensurate with the debt owed.55 Inasmuch as the property.interests of the owner-and'lienor conflict, it was not'unreasonable to
place the burden of challenging .th lienor's. continued possession on the
owner.56 Further; the-court ftiid that sale,-of the vehicle to -execute the lien
was not a denial of due process because the debtor was notified- of the impending sale and afforded -aft oppSortunity to take- legal action to -enjoin itY
The Second- Circuiit Court -6f Appeals; however, -reversed, and remanded,
finding tfhat-indef the principles of, Sniddach and-Fuentisthe sale provisions
of'th&New -York lien laws? might be repugnant-to due process-. Although the
district court's apprbach ih Hernandez .was unjustified- under -Sniadach and
Fuentes,60 the Supreme-couft'slater- tactic9- in Mitchell mark it as--singularly
prescient. The crucial- question is whether 'what the district court -regarded-as
a: xeasonable -accommodation -between the conflicting interests of the - owner
and-the lienor must also be regarded-as aconstitutional -accommodation under
Mitchell. -"----.
'
-

OF -FLORIDA'S LABORER'S LiN.

CONSTITUTIONA]I

The Lien

-

Possessory liens were first recognized on behalf of persons whose particular
trade or position carried with it-affirmative obligations."' Hence, an innkeeper
bound to accommodate a traveler in need of lodging could retain the traveler's personal property until his charge was satisfied.62 By the fifteenth century
this principle was expanded at common law so that persons who had done
in the deprivation of property, are applicable to the self-help remedies. See text accompanying notes 98-105 infra.
54. 346 F. Supp. 313 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973).
55. 346 F. Supp. at 318.

Id. at 319.: 57. Id.
56.

-

"-

. -

-

.58. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973).
59. N.Y. LIEN LAW §§184, 200-02,.'204 (McKinney 1966).
60. The court's reasoning presupposed that a security interest and the interest in use
and possession are equally significant property interests for the purposes of due process,
ignoring the fact that in Fuentes the debtor's interest in continued use and possession warranted due process protection despite the fact that, under a conditional sales contract, the
creditor had a security interest in, as well as title to, the goods in question. See Mason v.
Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420, 423-24 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Clark & Landers, supra note 18, at 387. In
addition, the court's reasoning was faulty in assuming that the debtor's ability to initiate
legal action to prevent the deprivation would take the place of a prior hearing. See Clark &
Landero, supra note 18,. at 387:
61. 7 W. HowswoarH, A HisroRY OF ENGIsu LAw 511 (2d ed. 1937).
62. Id. at 511-12.
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work upon and thereby improved the value of a chattel could retain the
chattel until the owner satisfied his debt.63 In the United States a common
law lien permitting retention of personal property was recognized in favor
of any mechanic, artisan, or laborer who by his skill and labor enhanced the
64
value of another's chattel.
At an early date most states enacted statutes expanding the class of persons entitled to liens for labor and providing for the added remedy of enforcement by sale. 65 In keeping with this trend, Florida provided liens for a
6
7
variety of persons 6 and made them enforceable by retention and sale 1 of
the enhanced property.
At present, Florida recognizes a lien "[i]n favor of persons performing
labor or services for any other person, upon the personal property of the
latter upon which the labor or services is performed." 69 In addition, since
the lien is dependent upon possession of the personal property on which the
labor was performed,'7 removal of such property from the possession of the
lienor is made a misdemeanor.-' The lien may be enforced by retention of
the property to which the lien has attached for not more than three months, 2
or by sale of the property without judicial proceedings at a public auction
after three months from the time the debt became due.7 3 Before enforcing
the lien by sale, however, the lienor must give public notice of the time and
4
place of the sale.7
Unlike many states,7 5 Florida has no specific lien provisions for work done
by mechanics or garagemen on motor vehicles. When, however, a lien for
work done on a motor vehicle is claimed under the laborer's lien statute, more
stringent notice procedures must be followed before the lien may be enforced by public sale. Notice of the impending sale must be mailed fifteen
days in advance to the person in whose name the vehicle is registered, as
well as to all persons claiming a lien on the vehicle. 76 In addition, notice of
the sale must be published in a newspaper of general circulation and posted
77
in three public places ten days prior to the date of sale.

63.
64.
65.
66.
by the
67.
68.

Id. at 512.
1 L. JoNEs, A TREATISE Or, TIE LAW OF LIENS §731 (3d ed. 1914).
Id. §749.
Fla. Rev. Stat. §§1730-40 (1892). The legislature was directed to provide such liens
1885 constitution. FLA. CONsT. art. 16, §22 (1885).
Fla. Rev. Stat. §1744 (1892)
Id. §1745.

69.

FLA. STAT. §713.58(1)

70.

Id. §713.58(3).

(1973).

71. Id. §713.58(2), (4).
72. Id. §85.011(1).
73. Id. §85.031(2).
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., GA. CODE

76.

FLA. STAT.

77.

Id.

ANN.

§68-423a (1967); N.Y. LiEN LAW §184 (McKinney 1966).

§85.031(3) (1973).
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State Action
The "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment 78 has at
times proved a barrier to due process attacks upon summary prejudgment
remedies. 79 A prejudgment remedy may not be deemed constitutionally defective for failure to afford a debtor due process unless the creditor's action
in making use of that remedy may be considered state action. The situation
is complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court did not confront a significant
state action problem in Sniadach, Fuentes, or Mitchell, the taking of property
in each case being accomplished by state officials. Moreover, extant state action doctrine has been formulated by the Supreme Court largely within the
context of civil rights cases and hence is of uncertain precedential value when
applied to debtors, creditors, and the deprivation of property.80 Nevertheless,
state and lower federal courts have been faced with ferreting out the existence
of state action in cases involving due process challenges to creditors' remedies.-1
The presence of state action within the context of self-help prejudgment
remedies has been predicated on a finding that the creditor's action was
authorized and encouraged by state statute,82 or that the creditor in seizing
the debtor's property to hold in satisfaction of a debt was performing a traditionally public function.8 3 It has also been suggested that in the case of a
repairman's lien, the state, by its authorization and regulation of the lienor's
conduct, has so "entwined" itself in the lienor's act as to make it the act of
the state. 4 While mechanic's lien cases have been largely silent with respect
to the state action issue, their findings of due process violations indicate that
state action is present under one or more of these theories.85
Florida specifically provides for enforcement of its statutory liens by retention and sale of a debtor's chattel, and as such, authorizes and encourages
resort to these remedies.8 8 A distinction has been made, however, between
78. U.S. Cosrr. amend. XIV, §1, provides in part: "No State shall ...deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." (Emphasis added.)
79. See, e.g., McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604, 606 (S.D. Fla. 1971);
Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617, 622-23 (Fla. 1973). See also Comment,
Debtor-CreditorRelations: The Florida Supreme Court Helps Those Who Help Themselves, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 343 (1974).
80. See, e.g., Adams v. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 333 (9th Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the relationship between "state action" doctrine developed in civil rights cases
and creditors' remedies, see Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors'

Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, (pt. 2), 47 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 1 (1973).
81. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1970); McCormick v. First
Nat'1 Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604, 606 (S.D. Fla. 1971).

82. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970); Barber v. Rader, 350
F. Supp. 183, 189 (S.D. Fla. 1972).

83. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970); Barber v. Rader, 350
F. Supp. 183, 189 (S.D. Fla. 1972).

84. Clark & Landers, supra note 18, at 388.
85. In Mason the problem never arose because the lien was executed by a state official.
See text accompanying notes 50-51 supra. In Hernandez, however, while the court failed

to reach the state action issue, it noted that state action would seem to be present. 346 F.
Supp. 313, 317 nA (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
86. See FLA. STAT. §§85.011(1), .031(2) (1973).
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statutory authorization, which actually creates the right, and authorization,
which merely parallels a contractual or common law right.8 7 Retention of a
debtor's property was recognized as a right of the lienor at common law and
consequently cannot be considered a statutory, state-created right. 88 Conversely, the right to auction a debtor's property is statutory in origin and
hence may be considered state action. 89
Findings of state action based on the performance of a public function
have been largely a phenomenon of the innkeeper's and landlord's lien cases
where the lienor actually seizes the debtor's property.90 The Florida statutes,
however, merely authorize retention and later disposition of property
voluntarily surrendered. Thus, it is difficult to view the mechanic or laborer
as the "alter ego" of the sheriff. 91 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that
state action is present because the public auctioneer retained by the lienor is
performing a traditionally public function by disposing of the debtor's pro92
perty to satisfy a debt.
Florida law also significantly regulates and supports the lienor's conduct.
The state provides sanctions against the removal of retained property from
the lienor's possession,93 regulates the manner in which the lienor may dispose
of the debtor's property by public sale,94 and establishes priorities among
various lienors.95 It would seem that through such regulation the state has
become entwined in the lienor's action.
Retention and sale of a debtor's property pursuant to Florida's laborer's
lien may thus be considered state action. When a creditor retains a debtor's
property his action is sanctioned, encouraged, supported, and regulated by
state statute. When a creditor proceeds to dispose of a debtor's property by
public sale his action is possible only because of statutory authorization, his
disposition of the property is regulated by state statute, and the auctioneer he
employs is performing a traditionally public function.
Due Process Infirmity
Pursuant to the Florida laborer's lien, a mechanic or laborer may enforce
his lien by retention and sale of the debtor's property. 9 Retention of the

87. Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Messenger v. Sandy
Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 8-9, 295 A.2d 402. 405-06 (Super. Ct. 1972); Northside Motors,

Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617, 622-23 (Fla. 1973). See also Note, State Action and the
Constitutionality of UCC 9-503, 30 WVAsH. & LEE L. REV. 547, 554-555 (1973).

88. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 65-68 supra.
90. See, e.g., Hall v. Carson, '130 F.2d 430, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1970); Barber v. Rader, 350
F. Supp. 183, 188-89 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
91. See Clark & Landers, supra note 18, at 388-89.
92. Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 313, 317 n.4 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (dictum).
93.

FLA. STAT. §§713.58(2), (4) (1973).

94. Id. §§85.031(2), (3).
95. Id. §713.73.
96. See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
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debtor's property, while perhaps not technicallya taking, serves to deny the
debtor use and possession of his property. The lienor's refusal to return the
97
property upon demand must in this sense -be, considered a "deprivation"
Moreover, if the mechanic or laborer elects to-'sell the chattel in satisfaction
of the debt, the debtor is permanently deprived of -ownership, use, and
possession. Clearly, then, the enforcement provisions of the Florida laborer's
lien permit the deprivation of significant property interests. To ascertain
whether this deprivation is effected without due process of law, however, it is
first necessary to inquire into the applicability of the due process standards of
Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell to the Florida laborer's lien.

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell, some question arose as to
whether Sniadach and Fuentes should be read as prescribing the appropriate
due process requirements for a deprivation of property only in instances
where the creditor and the government square off against the debtor.98 In
both Sniadach and Fuentes the.Court dealt with the invocation of state power
by a creditor to effect seizure of a debtor's property. 09 Moreover, the Court in
Fuentes indicated that a major purpose of due process is to insure that
governments follow, a fair procedure when acting to deprive a person .of his
possessions. 100 Since in Mitchell the state was also directly involved in thew deprivation through its courts and agents, the case sheds little light. on the question. 0
.
Several factors militate against acceptance of the proposition that the due
process standards enunciated in Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell are applicable
only to instances of direct state involvement. First, the Court in Fuentes also
indicated that due process is required to insure fairness to the individual
debtor and to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachment. 0 2 It is difficult to discern why there should be less concern when

a debtor's property is arbitrarily seized.by the creditor himself rather .than by
97. Clark & Landers, supra note 18, at 386; Note, The Application of Sniadach to
Banker's and Garageman's Liens, 4 Sw. U.L. Rj'v. 285, 303 (1972).
98. See, e.g., Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617, 620, 623-24 -(Fla; -1978;
Messenger v. Sandy- Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1,. 14-17, 295- A.2d 402, 409-10 '(Super. Ct.
1972); Brief for Florida Comm'n for Uniformity of Legislation as Amicus Curiae -at 20-23,
Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973).
99. See text accompanying notes 14, 24-25 supra. In-Fuentes the Court considered the
issue to be: "[W]hether procedural due process in the context of these cases requires an
opportunity for a hearing before the State authorizes its agents to seize propertyin the
possession of a person upon the application of another." 407 U.S. at 80.
100. Id. at 80-81.
101. Interestingly enough, the Court in Mitchell acknowledged the on-going debate
concerning the advisability of prior notice and hearing requirements in a self-help context.
The Court, however, expressed no view in the. matter, emphasizing that its holding was
limited to the constitutionality of the Louisiana sequestration procedures,-94 S. Ct. -at 190506 n.13.
102. 407 U.S. at 80-81. It has been suggested that resolution of the question surrounding
the extent to which prior notice and hearing requirements are applicable to private deprivations of property depends upon a determination of whether- their primary purpose is
to protect the debtor or to prevent state participation in proceedings that, may be unfair.
4

R.

ANDERSON,

UNIFORM. COMMERCIAL

CODE 267 (2d ed. Supp. 1974).
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the sheriff. Second, when, as in the case of the Florida laborer's lien, the
creditor's summary action is authorized by state statute, a narrow reading of
Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell would enable the state to tell creditors to do
for themselves what it is constitutionally forbidden to do. 1°3 Finally, extensions
of the due process requirements of prior notice and hearing to the landlord's
lier04 and the mechanic's lien' 0 ' must be read as rejections of the proposition
that Sniadach and Fuentes, and now Mitchell are limited to instances of direct state involvement. Thus, both precedent and policy dictate that the due
process standards of Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell be applied to the deprivation of property permitted by the Florida laborer's lien.
Sniadach and Fuentes require that notice and a hearing be afforded a debtor
before he can be deprived of the use and possession of his property. 06 Mitchell,
on the other hand, expresses a willingness to accept lessor protections for
the debtor in recognition of the fact that the creditor also has significant property interests at stake in a prejudgment remedy situation. 10 7 To the extent
that adequate substitute safeguards of the debtor's interest are available, then,
Sniadach and Fuentes must no longer be regarded as controlling. 08°
Using Mitchell as the standard, the question becomes what constitutes
adequate protection of the debtor's interests for the purposes of due process.
Louisiana's sequestration procedure protects the debtor against unwarranted
seizure of his property by requiring the creditor to make a specific showing of
facts entitling him to a writ of sequestration, by requiring judicial authorization of the writ, and by the deterrent effect of awarding damages to the debtor
if it is determined at a subsequent hearing that the writ was wrongfully obtained. 0 9 In addition, the Louisiana procedure protects the debtor against a
prolonged deprivation by entitling him to seek dissolution of the writ immediately and by placing the burden of proof upon the creditor.110 In short,
the risk of wrongful seizure is minimized and the potential impact of such
a seizure is circumscribed.
The quantum of protection afforded the debtor by the Florida laborer's
lien fails even to approach that furnished the debtor in Mitchell. The lienor's
decision to retain and sell the debtor's property is unilateral, predicated solely
upon his belief as to the existence of a debt and default. Moreover, no
hearing is even contemplated. Without establishing the validity of his underlying claim, the lienor may permanently dispose of the debtor's property by
sale at a public auction. The debtor's only recourse is to institute an action

103.

The inconsistency of this result is one of the reasons Professor Anderson concludes

that self-help repossession pursuant to UCC §9-503 is unconstitutional under Fuentes. Id.
at 268.
104. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp.
183 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
105. See, e.g., Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
106. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 36-43 supra.
108. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1908 (1974) (concurring opinion).
109. Id. at 1904-05.
110. Id. at 1899.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss4/8

12

Tilghman: The Florida Laborer's Lien: An Unconstitutional Creditor's Remedy

1974]

THE FLORIDA LABORER'S LIEN

against the lienor. It must be concluded, therefore, that the Florida laborer's
lien works a deprivation of property without due process of law.
CONCLUSION

The Florida laborer's lien fails to afford the debtor even a modicum of
protection, and as such is clearly unconstitutional under the Mitchell standard.
The fate of the Florida lien may depend in part, however, upon future developments in the state action concept with respect to self-help prejudgment
remedies. If the Supreme Court is desirous of further circumscribing the
effects of Sniadach and Fuentes, the state action requirement of the fourteenth
amendment provides a readymade vehicle. In addition, while state and lower
federal courts have extended the due process requirements of Sniadach and
Fuentes to the mechanic's lien despite the absence of direct state involvement,
the question of what is demanded by due process in the context of self-help
prejudgment remedies promises to be one of continuing vitality. The Florida
laborer's lien in its present form, however, should not be spared. Where bona
fide disputes arise as to the debt owed, and where the creditor may permanently and unilaterally deprive the debtor of his property, the debtor's need for
greater protection is clear.
JAmEs B. TILGHmAN, JR.
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